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Review of the Supreme Court's 1988-89
Term and Preview of the 1989-90 Term
for the Transnational Practitioner
J. Clark Kelso*
The Supreme Court of the United States did not make much news
during its 1988-89 Term, at least insofar as the transnational prac-
titioner is concerned.' The only purely transnational decision, Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,2 involved the Court's interpretation of
one of the limitation on liability provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The decision, although very important to the airline industry,
did not exactly make headlines in the United States or around the
world.
The Court set the stage for next year's term by granting review in
three cases raising important issues for the transnational practitioner.
This Article will preview those cases.
* Assistant Professor of Law; University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law,
1. Although the term "transnational law" is of course not susceptible to precise defi-
nition, for purposes of this series of articles on the Supreme Court, a decision has special
implications for the transnational practitioner only if it involves legal transactions between the
nationals of two or more states. See Doland, Book Review, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 499, 500 n.2
(1988).
2. 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
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I. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY UNDER TIM WARSAW CONVENTION
A. History of the Warsaw Convention
United States courts now have over fifty-five years of experience in
deciding cases involving international air travel under the Warsaw
Convention. Although various provisions of the Convention have been
under nearly constant attack, particularly those provisions limiting the
liability of air carriers, the Convention continues to serve the useful
function of unifying the rules regarding international air travel. 3 In
3. There is a wealth of secondary source material dealing with the Warsaw Convention
and with its treatment and interpretation by United States courts. The limitation of liability
provisions of the Warsaw Convention have been a particularly favorite topic of commentators,
most commentators being critical of these provisions. Johnson & Minch, The Warsaw Con-
vention Before the Supreme Court: Preserving the Integrity of the System, 52 J. Am L. &
CoM. 93 (1986); Jacobs & Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passengers: An Economic
Analysis of Liability Rules Under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. Am L. & COM. 589 (1986);
Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: A Critical View, 17 INTER-
AM. L. REV. 577 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitations]; Comment,
Saks: A Clarification of the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, 16 INTER-AM.
L. REv. 539 (1985); Comment, Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations: Constitutional Issues,
6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 896 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional Issues]; Comment,
The Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, 48 J. Am L. & Comm. 805 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Judicial Hostility]; Note,
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention and Franklin Mint v. TWA: A Conflict Between Treaty
and Municipal Statute, 16 CoiLn. INT'L L.J. 397 (1983). United States cases under the
Warsaw Convention have been chronicled and noted by student commentators with great
tenacity and regularity. See Casenote, International Liability Limitation Agreements: Republic
Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987), 53 J. Am L. & Comm.
839 (1988) [hereinafter Casenote]; Casenote, Liability of Air Carriers for Passenger Injuries:
Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985), 10 SUFFoix TRANSxAT'L L.J. 361 (1986); Casenote,
Air France v. Saks: The Applicability of the Warsaw Convention to a Passenger Injury
Sustained During a Routine International Flight, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REO. 157 (1986);
Recent Development, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention-Supreme Court Adopts a Purpose
Approach to Enforce an Anachronistic Convention System, 7 FoRDHAM INT'L. L.J. 592 (1984);
Casenote, Liability Limitations Under the Warsaw Convention-Trans World Airlines v.
Franklin Mint. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984), 50 J. Am L. & CoM. 155 (1984); Recent
Development, Franklin Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.-Limiting Air Carrier
Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, 11 SYRAcUsE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 651 (1984); Recent
Development, Warsaw Convention-Federal Court Abrogates Article on Liability Limitation,
7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 429 (1983); Casenote, Franklin Mint v. TWA: A Response to the
Warsaw Convention's Gold-Based Liability Limit Problem, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1009
(1983); Recent Development, Aviation: Enforceability of Warsaw Convention Limits on Lia-
bility in the United States, 24 HARv. INT'L L.J. 183 (1983); Note, The Demise of the Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention-An Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint Corp. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 57 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 592 (1983); Recent Development, Warsaw
Convention-Airline Employees Are Entitled to Assert as a Defense the Liability Limitations
of the Warsaw Convention as Modified by the Montreal Agreement, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 580
(1978); Recent Development, Limitation of Liability of Airline Agents and Employees Under
the Warsaw Convention, 12 SUroLK L. REv. 117 (1978); Note, Aviation Law: Attempts to
Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw
Convention, 54 Ca.-KENT L. REv. 851 (1978) [hereinafter Note]; Note, Warsaw Convention
Liability Principles Extend to Damage from Terrorist Attack, 6 GA. J. INT'L & CoMIP. L. 600
(1976).
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Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd. ,4 the Supreme Court of the United
States attempted to further this unification by giving the Convention's
rules on liability limitation a literal interpretation despite what may
have been a drafting error by the Convention's drafters.
By interpreting the Convention according to its literal terms and
resisting the temptation to rewrite the Convention in light of an
American sense of "fairness" or "justice," a temptation to which
many lower courts in the United States had succumbed, the Supreme
Court maximizes the likelihood that the Convention will be uniformly
interpreted. The decision reached by the Supreme Court is consistent
with an earlier decision from Canada's highest court.5 Fairness and
justice vary with the length of the chancellor's foot and with a
particular country's relative world view. By contrast, words in a
treaty, if they have an unambiguous meaning, are less likely to vary
from nation to nation. If the result which the Supreme Court reached,
limiting the recovery by the plaintiff for wrongful death to $75,000,
is unjust or unfair, the proper recourse is found by turning to the
drafters who are responsible for amending the treaty, not to the
courts which are responsible for interpreting the treaty.
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, more commonly known as the
Warsaw Convention, is a multilateral treaty which sets forth certain
uniform norms regarding litigation arising out of damages suffered
in the course of international air travel.6 The United States Senate
ratified the treaty in 1934 without having held any hearings or
debates. 7
The Convention contains regulations dealing with three separate
types of international air transactions: (1) transportation of people;
4. 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
5. Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979). Although
the Supreme Court cites Ludecke, it does not appear that the Court relied upon Ludecke in
reaching its decision. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the prior decision in Ludecke
had no effect upon the Supreme Court.
The Court did not cite the decision by the Italian Constitution Court in Coccia v. Turkish
Airlines, 108 Foro It. 1 1586 (Corte cost. 1985), reprinted and translated in 10 AnR L. 294
(1985), where the court struck down the liability limitation provisions for personal injury and
death as contrary to the Italian constitution. Practitioners representing plaintiffs under the
Warsaw Convention in the United States should explore a similar argument under the United
States Constitution under the Takings Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection
Clause. See Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitation on Liability: The Need for Reform
After Coccia v. Turkish Airlines, 11 FoRDITA INT'L L.J. 132 (1987).
6. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1502 note (1982) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
7. See Casenote, supra note 3, at 846.
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(2) transportation of baggage; and (3) transportation of freight. For
each of these transactions, the Convention sets forth specific ticket
or document requirements. For example, Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention provides as follows:
(1). For the transportation of passengers the carriers must deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of
necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration
shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation
of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.'
Similar provisions exist in articles 4 and 8 with regard to baggage
checks and air waybills, respectively. 9
8. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, at art. 3.
9. Id. at art. 4. Article 4 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destinatidn;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to the bearer of the
baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance with article 22(2);
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
Id.
Article 8 of the Warsaw Contention provides in pertinent part as follows:
The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of its execution;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises that
right the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation
of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the consignor;
(e) The name and address of the first carrier;
(f) The name and address of the consignee, if the case so requires;
(g) The nature of the goods;
(h) The number of packages, the method of packing, and the particular marks
or numbers upon them;
(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or dimensions of the goods;
(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the packing;
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Passenger tickets, baggage checks, and air waybills are all supposed
to contain "[a statement that the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this convention."' 0 The "rules
relating to liability" are found elsewhere in the Convention." In
1934, when the United States ratified the Convention, recovery for
personal injuries or death was limited to approximately $8,300,
recovery for damage or loss to checked baggage or freight was limited
to approximately $17 per kilogram, and recovery for damage or loss
to unchecked baggage and objects was limited to approximately $332
per passenger, absent an agreement to the contrary between the
carrier and customer.12
It is relatively clear why the drafters of the Convention agreed
upon these liability limitation provisions and why the United States
agreed to be bound by these provisions. A letter from Secretary of
State Cordell Hull to the Senate in 1934 explains part of the rationale
for the limitation provisions:
(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date and place of payment, and
the person who is to pay it;
(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery, the price of the goods, and,
if the case so requires, the amount of the expenses incurred;
(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance with article 22(2);
(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;
(o) The documents handed to the carrier to accompany the air waybill;
(p) The time fixed for the completion of the transportation and a brief note of
the route to be followed, if these matters have been agreed upon;
(q) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
Id. at art. 8.
10. Id. at arts. 3(1), (3); 4(3)(h); 8(q).
11. Limitation of liability is provided for in Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention.
12. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, at art. 22. Article 22 provides as follows:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger
is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the
court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of
periodic payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed
125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may
agree to .a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the carrier
is limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at
the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of
the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In
that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless he proves that sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability of
the carrier is limited to 4,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above are deemed to refer to the French franc consisting
of 65 milligrams of gold at the standard fineness of nine hundred thousandths.
These sums may be converted into any national currency in round figures.
Id.
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It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but
that it will prove to be an aid in the development of international
air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more
definite basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable
result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating
expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in
the way of reduced transportation charges. 3
Although some portions of this explanation are certainly subject
to challenge as political smoke-blowing or over-simplistic analysis,' 4
it surely takes no great powers of perception to recognize that one
purpose of Article 22's limitation of liability was to help protect and
subsidize the fledgling airline industry.
The limitation of liability provisions protect not only private in-
dustry, of course, but also those countries which operate their own
air carriers. In the absence of the limitation provisions, countries
which operate their own carriers would have left themselves open to
possibly crippling damage judgments. Indeed, as Professors Lowen-
feld and Mendelsohn noted in their much-cited 1967 article in the
Harvard Law Review, "[s] ome [countries] even contended that the
limit was too high, thus discouraging a number of countries ...
from adhering to the Convention." ' 5 The absence of any limits on
liability would surely have doomed the Convention to a quick ob-
scurity.
Not all nations agreed with the limitation on liability provisions,
however. Even though the United States Senate ratified the treaty in
1934, there almost immediately appeared in the United States and
elsewhere strong opposition to Article 22's limits.' 6 After a series of
false starts, a conference convened at the Hague in 1955 agreed to
amend the Warsaw Convention by increasing the amounts which
could be recovered.17 The limit for personal injury or death, for
example, was doubled to around $16,600.18
13. SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MESSAGE FROM TH PRESIDmT OF THE UNITED
STATES TRANSMrTTING A CONVENTION FOR TIE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULEs, S. EXEC. Doc.
No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
14. See Comment, Constitutional Issues, supra note 3, at 904-06.
15. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv.
L. REV. 497, 504 (1967).
16. See id. at 502; Comment, Judicial Hostility, supra note 3, at 810; Casenote, supra
note 3, at 846-47.
17. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [here-
inafter Hague Protocol].
18. Id. at art. XI.
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The United States had asked the Hague conference for the limit
to be set at $25,000.19 Resistance in the United States to the limitation
provision prevented the Hague Protocol from being ratified by the
Senate. Professor Lowenfeld explained the United States position as
follows:
Our quarrel rather is with the other compromise contained in the
Warsaw Convention: the compromise between the interests of the
airlines and the interests of the traveling public.... [T]he overriding
issue in the Warsaw Convention, as we see it, is that is was entered
into in the late 1920's, when international aviation was hardly over
the experimental stage and when the primary need was a means to
prevent the growth of international aviation being choked off by
one or more catastrophic accidents. Today, in contrast, international
aviation is big business. We are over the experimental stage. We
are over the infant industry stage .... [T]he hazards of flying have
been very much reduced and are actuarialy predictable.
For these reasons the United States believes that there is no longer
justification for a convention which tips the balance heavily in favor
of the industry and against the consumer.20
Dissatisfaction with continuing negotiations led the United States
in 1965 to notify the contracting parties that the United States
intended to denounce the Warsaw Convention, a denunciation which,
according to article 39, would become effective six months after
notification. 2'
With the stick of denunciation by the largest contracting state
firmly in one hand, the United States held a carrot in the other: The
United States would retract its denunciation if all international air
carriers agreed to certain changes in the Warsaw Convention. Most
pertinently, the United States demanded that air carriers waive the
limits in the Hague Protocol with respect to passenger injuries and
substitute in their place a limitation of $75,000 for passenger inju-
ries.22
The crisis created by the threatened withdrawal of the United
States from the Warsaw Convention was averted when the interna-
19. See Comment, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International
Aviation Accidents, 51 J. Am L. & CoM. 953, 957 (1986).
20. Lowenfeld, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 580,
580-82 (1966).
21. U.S. Gives Notice of Denunciation of Warsaw Convention, 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923
(1965).
22. Id. Article 22 itself provided that the limits could be changed by special agreement
between the carrier and passenger.
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tional air carriers capitulated to the United States demand. In the
Montreal Agreement, the air carriers agreed to the United States
demand with respect to any flight which included the United States
as a point of origin, point of destination, or agreed stopping place. 23
It is useful at this point to summarize the present state of affairs
under the Warsaw Convention with respect to limitations of liability
for personal injury or death. The carrier must deliver to all passengers
a ticket which contains a statement that the transportation is subject
to the limitations of the Warsaw Convention except that, pursuant
to the Montreal Agreement, the dollar amount of the limitation shall
be $75,000 rather than the dollar amount set forth in the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. It is fair to say that
the United States, including most lower federal courts, remained
openly hostile even to the $75,000 limitation of liabilityA'
B. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.
This brings us now to consider the facts facing the Supreme Court
in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd. The case involves the death of
passengers on the ill-fated Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight #007 which
was shot down by a Soviet fighter on September 1, 1983, over the
Sea of Japan. Survivors filed wrongful death actions against KAL
in a number of federal district courts, and the actions were consol-
idated for pretrial proceedings in the District Court for the District
of Columbia.
23. Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, I.A.T.A. Agreement Re: Liability Limitations, 44 C.A.B.
819 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement], reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The
Montreal Agreement required air carriers to make that special agreement. The Montreal
Agreement did not amend the Warsaw Convention, however. Subsequent efforts to amend the
Convention itself have been unsucessful largely because of the United States' refusal to ratify
a convention that contains any limitation of liability provision. See Casenote, supra note 3,
at 849-51.
24. See, e.g., Westerns v. Flying Tiger Line, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965) (loss of Warsaw
Convention limits unless airline delivers passenger ticket sufficiently in advance so passenger
may take additional precautions); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965)
(Warsaw Convention liability limitations lost because passeneger ticket not delivered sufficiently
in advance so passenger could purchase insurance); Lisi v. Alitalia-Ziner Aeree Italiane, S.P.A.,
370 F.2d 1508 (2d Cir. 1966) (airline not entitled to Warsaw Convention liability limitations
since passenger ticket printed in 4 point typesize). Cf. Ross v. Pan American Airways, 299
N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949) (Warsaw Convention liability limitations applied even though
passenger ticket delivered only moments before departure). See also Comment, Judicial
Hostility, supra note 3, at 824-28 (commenting on history of judicial hostility to Warsaw
Convention); Note, supra note 3, at 860-63 (commenting on history of judicial hostility to
Warsaw Convention); Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitations, supra note 3, at 590-91
(commenting on history of judicial hostility to Warsaw Convention).
1989 / The Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term
All parties to the lawsuit agreed that the Warsaw Convention
applied. Pursuant to Article 22 and the Montreal Agreement, each
plaintiff's recovery would be limited to $75,000. The plaintiffs ar-
gued, however, that the limits imposed by these agreements did not
apply. The tickets which KAL delivered to the passengers contained
a notice of limitation of liability that did not comply with the specific
requirements of the Montreal Agreement. The Montreal Agreement
provided that each ticket delivered to a passenger should contain a
notice of the limitation of liability in at least 10-point type. The
tickets delivered to the passengers on KAL Flight #007 contained the
limitation notice in only 8-point type.2
The plaintiffs sought by a motion for partial summary judgment
a declaration that the too-small type on the tickets deprived KAL of
the Warsaw Convention's liability limitation. The district court dis-
agreed with the plaintiffs and denied the motion. 26 Recognizing the
importance of the issue for possible settlement purposes and for the
subsequent proceedings in the case, the district court certified for
interlocutory appeal its otherwise unappealable order. The court of
appeals affirmed, adopting the district court's opinion in full.27 The
Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to consider
the case.2s
Article 3(2) of the Convention specifically deals with the effect of
failing to deliver tickets to passengers or delivering non-conforming
tickets:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself
of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability. 29
25. Here is the difference between 10-point and 8-point type: This is printed in 10-
point type. This is printed in 8-point type.
26. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 19 Av. L. Rep. (CCH)
17,584 (1985).
27. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
28. 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988). The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the lower
federal courts concerning the proper interpretation of the Warsaw Convention when the carrier
delivers tickets that do not conform to specific requirements in the Convention or in the
Montreal Agreement. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1679 (1989).
29. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, at art. 3(2).
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The first sentence of Article 3(2) clearly provides that the "irregularity
* of the passenger ticket" does not affect the validity of the
contract of transportation. 0 More importantly, that contract "shall
none the less be subject to the rules of this convention," including
the rules on liability limitation.31 Relying upon the definition of
"irregularity" in the Webster's Second International Dictionary, the
Court concluded that, because of the first sentence in Article 3(2),
"a delivered document does not fail to qualify as a 'passenger ticket,'
and does not cause forfeiture of the damages limitation, merely
because it contains a defective notice. '32
This does not end the analysis, of course, since the second sentence
of Article 3(2) specifically deals with whether the carrier may "avail
himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or limit
his liability. 3 3 The second sentence is significantly different from
the first sentence. Whereas the first sentence deals with the "absence,
irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket," the second sentence
covers only non-delivery of tickets.34
Courts which were generally critical of liability limitation provisions
could easily overcome the words in the second sentence. If the second
sentence requires non-delivery, then, as the Supreme Court noted,
courts could "equated non-delivery of a ticket, for purposes of
[Article 3(2)], with the delivery of a ticket in a form that fails to
provide adequate notice of the Warsaw limitation. ' 35 Since 10-point
type was required by the Montreal Agreement, it would be rational
to hold as a matter of law that any type smaller than 10-point type
failed to provide adequate notice, and the inadequate notice would
trigger Article 3(2), thereby depriving the carrier of the limitation of
liability provision of the Convention. 36
There is some reason to believe that the drafters of the Convention
intended Article 3(2) to have this meaning, and that the language in
Article 3(2), which is, at best, ambiguous, was the result of a
monumental drafting error. In an initial draft of the Convention,
Article (3)(2) read as follows:
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680-81.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1680.
36. As discussed below, Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Chan, disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention, but he ultimately
rejected the notion that the 10-point type requirement in the Montreal Agreement established
a legal minimum under the Warsaw Convention.
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If, for international transportation, the carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been made out, or if the ticket
does not contain the above-mentioned particulars, the contract is
still subject to the rules of this Convention, but the carrier shall
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention
which totally or partially exclude his direct liability or liability
derived from the negligence of his agents.17
Recall that the Convention contains separate but similar provisions
for international documentation regarding passengers, checked bag-
gage, and freight. 38 In its initial drafts, the convention contained
provisions for checked baggage and freight similar to the provision
just quoted. That is, the Convention treated documentation for
passengers, checked baggage, and freight similarly, and provided a
similar sanction for a carrier's failure to conform the documentation
to the Convention's requirements.3 9
The Greek delegation objected to the sanctions contained in the
Convention. The delegation claimed that the sanctions were too
harsh, especially where the failure to include within a document all
of the particulars was a result of simple omission by an employee
of the carrier. The delegation proposed at the Warsaw meeting to
delete the words "or if the document does not contain the above
particulars" from the sanction clause dealing with passenger tickets. 4°
The drafting commission agreed to this change. 41
The sanctions provided for non-conforming documents with regard
to baggage and freight were not amended. The end result is that the
explicit sanction for non-conforming baggage and freight documents
is loss of the protections of the Convention, yet there is no sanction
37. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
38. See supra note 9.
39. The reporter for the drafts made it clear that this parallel treatment was specifically
intended. The reporter for the Convention opened the Warsaw session in 1929 with the
following explanation:
In chapter 2, we examined the matter of documents of transportation: passenger
ticket, baggage check, air waybill for goods. All these documents contain a minimum
of particulars. [ 1 The essential thing, with regard to this, is the sanction, sanction
provided for the three documents and which consists in withdrawing from the carrier
who would transport passengers or goods without documents, or with documents
not in conformity with the convention, the benefit of the advantages provided by
the convention.
ICAO, Second International Conference on Private Air Law, Oct. 4-12, 1929, at 19-20
(emphasis added). See also Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
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for delivery of non-conforming passenger tickets. 42 The majority of
the Court used the difference between Article 3 dealing with passenger
tickets, and Articles 4 and 9, dealing with baggage and freight, as
supporting the majority's conclusion that there was no sanction for
delivering a passenger ticket which did not contain the minimum
requirements imposed by the Convention. 43 The majority also pro-
posed several possible reasons for treating passengers different from
baggage and freight, thus suggesting that the difference was more
than "an obvious drafting error." 44
42. Article 4(4) of the Warsaw Convention, dealing with the baggage check, provides as
follows:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage check shall not affect the existence
or the validity of the contract of transportation which shall none the less be subject
to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage without
a baggage check having been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain
the particulars set out at (d), 09, and (h) above [section (h) contains the adequate
notice provision], the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions
of the convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, at art. 4(4) (emphasis added).
Article 9, dealing with air waybills, provides as follows:
If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having been made out, or if the
air waybill does not contain all the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (i), inclusive,
and (q) [which contains the adequate notice provision], the carrier shall not be
entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit
his liability.
Id. at art. 9.
43. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
44. Id. at 1683. Speaking for the Court, Justice Scalia explained:
Petitioners and the Solicitor General seek to explain the variance between Section I
and Sections II and III (as well as the clear text of Article 3) as a drafting error,
and lead us through the labyrinth of the Convention's drafting history in an effort
to establish this point. It would be absurd, they urge, for defective notice to eliminate
liability limits on baggage and air freight but not on personal injury and death.
Perhaps not. It might have been thought, by the representatives from diverse countries
who drafted the Convention in 1925 and 1929 (an era when even many States of
this country had relatively low limits on wrongful death recovery) that the $8,300
maximum liability established for personal injury or death was a "fair" recovery in
any event, so that even if the defective notice caused the passenger to forgo the
purchase of additional insurance, he or his heirs would be treated with rough equity
in any event. Cf. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 104 (1935) ("In about one-
third of the states, a fixed limit upon the recovery under the Death Act is imposed
in the statute. The usual limit is $10,000, but in some instances the maximum is
$7,500 or $5,000"). Quite obviously, however, the limitation of liability for baggage
and freight (about $16.50 per kilogram, see Article 22(2)) was not set with an eye
to fair value (the very notion of a "fair" average value of goods per kilogram is
absurd), biut perhaps with an eye to fair level of liability in relation to profit on the
carriage-so that the shipper of lost goods misled by the inadequate notice would
not be compensated equitably. Another possible explanation for the difference in
treatment is that the limitations on liability prescribed for baggage and freight are
much more substantial and thus notice of them is much more important. They
include not just a virtually nominal monetary limit, but also total exclusion of
liability for "an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation."
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan interpreted Article 3 in
light of the purpose of the Greek amendment. Justice Brennan
concluded that the no-sanction amendment should be given effect
only in those cases involving "clerical errors in selling in the ticket
forms." 45 In cases where the non-conformity is not the result of
clerical error, Justice Brennan would sanction the carrier by depriving
the carrier of the Convention's limitations of liability. 6
A majority of the Court rejected Justice Brennan's use of the
legislative history surrounding the Convention. Utilizing a "plain-
meaning" approach to interpretation, the Court gave Article 3(2) its
literal meaning:
We must thus be governed by the text solemnly adopted by the
governments of many separate nations whatever conclusions might
be drawn from the intricate drafting history that petitioners and
the Solicitor General have brought to our attention. The latter may
of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous, see,
e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985). But where the text
is clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert an amendment. 47
The Court then closed its analysis with a quote from Justice Story
in 1821:
[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause,
whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part
an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions.
It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty. Neither can this
Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law.
We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of
interpretation applied to the subject matter; and having found that,
our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that
stops whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it
leaves behind.4
Article 20. Or perhaps the difference in treatment can be traced to a belief that
people were much more likely, if adequate notice was given, to purchase additional
insurance on goods than on their own lives-not only because baggage and freight
is lost a lot more frequently than passengers, but also because the Convention itself
establishes, in effect, an insurance-purchasing counter at the airport for baggage and
freight, providing that if the consignor makes "a special declaration of the value at
delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires," the carrier will
be liable for actual value up to the declared sum. Article 22(2); see also Articles
4(g), 8(m).
Id.
45. Id. at 1690 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1683-84.
48. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 WHEAT. 1, 71, 5 L. Ed.
191 (1821)).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
The Court's decision in Chan would appear to end most of the
controversy surrounding the enforceability of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's limitation on liability provisions. 49 So long as the carrier delivers
a ticket to a passenger, the limitation provisions will apply. The
Court left open only the smallest room for argument in the following
passage:
When Article 3(2), after making this much clear, continues (in the
second sentence) 'Nevertheless, if a carrier accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, etc.,' it can only
be referring to the carrier's failure to deliver any document whatever,
or its delivery of a document whose shortcomings are so extensive
that it cannot reasonably be described as a 'ticket' (for example, a
mistakenly delivered blank form, with no data filled in). 0
This appears, however, to be a very small crack, and practitioners
can be sure that the Supreme Court will try to keep its finger firmly
planted in that crack to prevent Article 3(2) from crumbling.
II. Pimvmw OF = 1989-90 TEvm
A. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of California-
Standing of a Foreign Parent to Challenge a State's Unitary Tax
System
One of the more serious commercial and trade disputes between
the United States and foreign nations concerns the tax laws of several
states which utilize a "unitary" tax approach in computing corporate
tax.5' A unitary tax approach generally involves ignoring formal
corporate structure in determining corporate earnings. Instead the
approach favors an analysis based upon the "unitary business" which
a corporation engages in, whether by itself or through affiliated
companies. In Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of
49. An issue that remains undecided in the United States is whether the limitation
provisions are contrary to the United States Constitution. See supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
50. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1681 (emphasis added).
51. England, for example, has authorized its treasury department to retaliate against the
United States by denying a United Kingdom tax credit to United States companies with
substantial operations in unitary tax states. See United Kingdom Finance Act of 1985, New
Clause 27. An amicus brief filed on behalf of the Member States of the European Communities
and the Governments of Australia, Japan and Switzerland characterizes the resolution of the
issue as one of "vital importance to the fifteen countries and to their future economic and
commercial relations with the U.S." See Alcan Aluminum v. Franchise Tax Bd., 860 F.2d
688, 698 n.11 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
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California5 2 for example, a foreign corporation had a wholly owned
California subsidiary. In determining the taxable earnings of the
California subsidiary, the California Franchise Tax Board used the
following procedure:
[The Franchise Tax Board] first determines the scope of the 'unitary
business' in which a California corporation participates with affil-
iated companies and calculates the total earnings of this unitary
enterprise. It then computes an allocation fraction for each affected
taxpayer. This fraction is an unweighted average of three ratios,
the ratios of California payroll to total payroll, California property
value to total property value and California sales to total sales.
Multiplying a corporation's allocation fraction by the total income
of the unitary business in which it participates yields that corpor-
ation's taxable income for purposes of the franchise tax."3
A unitary taxing scheme of this sort risks overstating the income
attributable to operations within the taxing state. Since a systematic
overstatement of domestic income imposes a burden on interstate
commerce (by imposing a special burden on out-of-state affiliated
companies), unitary taxing schemes are to be subject to constitutional
scrutiny under the commerce clause and foreign commerce clause.
The Supreme Court has held that the threat of overstatement by
itself does not cause unitary taxing schemes to be in violation of the
commerce clause.54 The Court has left open, however, whether the
application of a unitary taxing scheme to a domestic subsidiary of a
foreign parent violates the foreign commerce clause's proscription
against multiple taxation and impairment of federal uniformity. 5
This constitutional challenge could conceivably arise in either state
or federal court since a federal constitutional question is involved.
The Tax Injunction Act usually makes this choice illusory, however,
forcing the challenge to be raised initially in state court. The Tax
Injunction Act provides as follows:
[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assess-
ment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State1 6
52. 860 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
53. Id. at 690.
54. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Mobil Oil Co. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
55. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26, 195 n.32. See also Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (discussing inquiry court must make when
considering multiple taxation question).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
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Thus, so long as a state provides a "plain, speedy and efficient
remedy," a federal court has no power to "enjoin, suspend or
restrain" the assessment or collection of state taxes. Because of the
Tax Injunction Act, the domestic subsidiary in Alcan Aluminum, a
California corporation, has been pursuing its remedy before Califor-
nia state administrative officials and courts, which are fully competent
to hear and decide the constitutional issue raised.17
Apparently sensing that the constitutional claim might be more
fairly or quickly resolved in federal court, the foreign parent brought
an action for a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The foreign parent's action is not barred
by the Tax Injunction Act because it is clear that the foreign parent
has no remedy under state law; the California procedures may be
utilized only by the taxpayer.58
The inapplicability of the Tax Injunction Act does not end the
pre-trial squabbles. First, it is far from clear that the foreign parent
has standing in federal court to complain about the way California
computes the taxes of the foreign parent's California subsidiary.
Second, even if the foreign parent would have standing in federal
court to raise this complaint, fundamental principles of comity-
principles which underlie the Tax Injunction Act-strongly militate
against having a federal court action running concurrently with state
court proceedings when the sole issue to be raised in the federal
proceeding will surely be resolved in the state proceeding, and the
federal action is brought by the corporate parent of the corporation
litigating in the state courts.
The district court dismissed the federal action, holding that the
corporate parent did not have standing to sue because the parent
was injured only in its capacity as shareholder. Under well-established
standing rules, a shareholder ordinarly cannot bring suit on behalf
of the corporation in the absence of a direct and independent injury
to the shareholder.5 9 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the corporate parent had standing and that
there was no basis for abstaining. ° The court of appeals' standing
holding created a conflict between the circuit courts,61 and the Su-
57. Alcan Alumuminum, 860 F.2d at 691.
58. Id. at 698.
59. Id. at 689.
60. Id. at 700.
61. See Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1012 (1983); Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, 558 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
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preme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the
following important questions:
(1) Does foreign company that is sole stockholder of American
subsidiary have standing to challenge in federal court accounting
method by which California determines locally taxable income of
that subsidiary? (2) Assuming that requisite standing exists in such
instance, is federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief
nevertheless barred by Tax Injunction Act (28 USC 1341) or prin-
ciple of comity that underlies act?62
As a practical matter, it seems apparent that the corporate parent
was engaging in nation-wide forum shopping. The corporate subsid-
iary was a California corporation subject to a California tax. The
corporate parent did not file suit in a California federal court because
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whose jurisdiction includes
California, had already determined that a corporate parent had no
standing in the circumstances presented.6 3 This factor by itself may
influence the Supreme Court's decision. 64
More to the point, so long as the state forum remains open to
consider the constitutionality of its unitary tax scheme, there seems
little reason to open the federal courts to a suit by the state corpor-
ation's foreign parent. Since the federal suit would of necessity
duplicate the efforts of the state courts, it seems likely that the
Supreme Court will decide to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court will have a
choice of rationales. It could easily apply the shareholder standing
rule and find that the foreign parent's injury flows entirely from its
shareholder status. Alternatively, the Court could easily find that the
federal court should abstain. The Court's many abstention doctrines
are surely flexible enough to prevent the corporate parent's attempt
to do an end-run around the available state procedures. 65
B. Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics-The Act of
State Doctrine and Foreign Corrupt Practices
Commercial bribery is an unfortunate reality of certain transna-
tional commercial transactions. In order to secure contracts with a
62. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 57 U.S.L.W. 3681
(1989).
63. Shell Petroleum, 709 F.2d at 595-96.
64. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 407 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall took critical note of Texaco's choice of a forum "more than halfway across
the country from the locale in which the case was tried." Id.
65. In particular, the case might be an appropriate one for abstention under Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), or Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). See Davies, Pullman and Burford, Abstension: Clarifying the
Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1 (1986).
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foreign government, a hungry contractor may make payments or
kickbacks to high government officials-often labelled "commis-
sions"-in return for receiving the government's business. In reaction
to these practices, the Congress enacted and the President signed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits such activity by
United States companies. 6
Kirkpatrick, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics is a civil suit brought
by the losing bidder against a contractor who was awarded a military
contract by a foreign government as a result of bribes paid to foreign
officials. After the successful bidder, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., was
awarded a military contract by the government of Nigeria, the losing
bidder, Environmental Tectonics Corporation ("ETC"), learned that
its bid had been lower than Kirkpatrick's, and ETC decided to
investigate the circumstances under which the contract had been
awarded. It discovered Kirkpatrick's bribery scheme, and reported
its findings to the United States Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria. Following
an investigation by the United States Justice Department, Kirkpatrick
and Carpenter, high company officials in Kirkpatrick & Co., were
charged with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. They each
pleaded guilty to one violation of the Act.67
Not satisfied with having exposed Kirkpatrick's illegal practices,
ETC shortly thereafter filed an action for damages against Kirkpa-
trick & Co. under the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Acts6 8 the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act, 69 and the Robinson-
Patman Act. 70 Among other pre-trial challenges to the lawsuit, Kirk-
patrick & Co. asserted that the act of state doctrine barred consid-
eration of the claims by the federal court. The district court agreed,
and dismissed the action.7 1 The court of appeals reversed.
The act of state doctrine is a judicially-created limitation on the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction. The doctrine finds its modem
inspiration in the separation of powers between the branches of the
United States government. 72 In particular, since the conduct of foreign
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, -2 (1982 & Supp 1988).
67. Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1055-57 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989).
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1980).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 41-1, -9 (West 1982).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1973).
71. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Intl. v. W.S. Kirpatrick & Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp.
1381 (D.N.J. 1987).
72. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally Gevurtz,
Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even
the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 250-64 (1987) (discussing decisions
on act of state in context of commercial bribery).
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affairs has been vested primarily in the Executive Branch, both by
tradition and by explicit Constitutional delegation,73 federal courts
must exercise care and caution in adjudicating claims that involve
judgments being rendered about the legality of foreign government
practices. Such judgments may tread upon the Executive Branch's
constitutional powers. The act of state doctrine must not be cavalierly
applied, however, since its application results in an individual litigant
being forced to "forgo decisions on the merits of their claims." 74
The Supreme Court's decisions on the act of state doctrine have
generally involved state expropriations of private property.75 Kirk-
patrick, by contrast, involves the award of a government military
contract. A preliminary question then is whether the act of state
doctrine should apply when the foreign government practice being
examined involves the award of military contracts. Both the district
court and the court of appeals held that the award of a major
military contract (as opposed, for example, to the granting of a
patent or award of a contract for paper) involved national security
considerations that could potentially have far-reaching international
and political repercussions.7 6 Both courts also agreed that the "com-
mercial act" exception to the act of state doctrine-an exception
never approved by a majority of the Supreme Court77 -did not apply
since, again, a military procurement decision "is by its very nature
governmental. "78
The district court and court of appeals disagreed, however, with
whether the act of state doctrine ultimately barred federal court
consideration of the plaintiffs claims. The district court held that
the doctrine applied "if the inquiry presented for judicial determi-
nation includes the motivation of a sovereign act which would result
in embarrassment to the sovereign or constitute interference in the
conduct of the foreign policy of the United States." ' 79 Under this
formulation, the federal action was barred since an inquiry into
whether Nigerian officials had accepted bribes (1) involved an inquiry
73. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
74. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
75. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398; First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 759.
76. Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. granted in part, 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989).
77. Alfred Dunhill of London v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
78. Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1059.
79. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Intl. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1381,
1392-93 (D.N.J. 1987).
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into the "motivation" of the government's decision to award the
contract to Kirkpatrick & Co. and (2) would result in "embarrass-
ment" to Nigeria.
The district court's holding was contrary to the position expressed
by the Department of State in a letter to the district court from
Abraham D. Sofaer, the Department of State's legal counsel.8 0 The
Department of State took the position that "[i]f the adjudication of
this suit were to involve a judicial inquiry into the motivations of
the Government of Nigeria's decision to award the contract, the
Department does not believe the act of state doctrine would bar the
Court from adjudicating this dispute."'" According to the Department
of State, the act of state doctrine would bar a federal court action
only if there would be a judicial determination of or inquiry into
"the validity or legality of foreign government actions.' '82
The court of appeals largely adopted the Department of State's
view of the act of state doctrine. According to the court of appeals,
the doctrine bars a federal court action only if (1) the federal court
would necessarily render a judgment concerning the "legal validity"
of a foreign government's practices or (2) the defendant shows "a
demonstrable, not a speculative, threat to the conduct of foreign
relations by the political branches of the United States government."3
An inquiry into the Nigerian government's motivation for awarding
the defense contract would not involve a judicial determination that
the award was illegal or void, and the defendant had made no
demonstrative showing that the civil suit would pose a real threat to
the conduct of United States foreign relations. The court of appeals
held that the suit was not barred by the act of state doctrine.
It seems likely that the Supreme Court will affirm the court of
appeals. The court of appeals' decision is consonant with the position
expressed by the Executive Branch in its letter to the trial court. To
the extent that the act of state doctrine is based upon a separation
of powers rationale, the letter from the Department of State suggests
that separation of powers would not be offended by federal court
adjudication of ETC's claims against Kirkpatrick & Co. The De-
partment of State's position is of course not determinative, since the
Court must make its own evaluation of the appropriateness of
80. The letter is reprinted in full in Environmental Tectonics, 847 F.2d at 1068-69.
81. Id. at 1068.
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 1061.
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exercising its jurisdiction.8 4 Nevertheless, it would be somewhat sur-
prising for the Court as presently constituted to reject the Executive
Branch's formal declaration that ETC's lawsuit does not trigger the
act of state doctrine. 85
C. Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States-The Applicability of the
Fourth Amendment's Protection Against Unreasonable Search and
Seizure to the Search of a Foreign Citizen's Home in a Foreign
Country
In a decision that is almost sure to be reversed, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officers must seek a search
warrant from a United States magistrate before conducting the search
of a foreign citizen's home as a joint venture with foreign law
enforcement officers.16 The case involved the joint search by DEA
agents and Mexican law enforcement officials of two homes in
Mexico, both owned by Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national. The
district court held that the Fourth Amendment had been violated by
the search and that the evidence obtained in the search should be
suppressed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion authored
by Judge Thompson, joined by Judge Norris, over a dissent by Judge
Wallace. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to consider
the following question:
Must evidence seized from foreign national's residence in foreign
country be suppressed under Fourth Amendment because U.S. law
enforcement officers who conducted seizure, in conjunction with
foreign officials and with their approval, did not have search
warrant? 7
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit made three critical
holdings. First, it held that the defendant could raise a Fourth
Amendment challenge even though the defendant was a Mexican
84. First National Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
85. Id. In First National Bank, Justice Rehnquist argued that the courts should generally
defer in individual cases to the Executive Branch's determination regarding the applicability
of the act of state doctrine. Rehnquist was joined in this view by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White. A majority of the Court at the time (Douglas, Powell, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun) rejected Rehnquist's position. It seems very likely, however, that the
three Reagan appointees, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, will join Rehnquist and White in
defering to the institutional expertise of the Department of State in foreign affairs.
86. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
87. 57 U.S.L.W. 3681 (1989).
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national.8 8 Second, it held that the search was a "joint venture"
between the United States and Mexican officials, and was thus subject
to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 9 Third, it held the DEA agents were
not entitled to rely upon the statements by Mexican officials that the
search had been properly authorized, and the DEA agents were
instead required to obtain a search warrant from a United States
court. 9°
Resolution of the first issue, whether a foreign national could claim
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, involves a consideration
of the fundamental relationship between government and the people
subject to the government's control, and the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the dissenting opinion, the Constitution
represents a "compact" between the people and government. 9' Be-
cause the relationship between government and the people is essen-
tially contractual in nature,
[n]o one can seriously doubt that the compact applies only to the
people who empowered the government of the United States for
the benefit of themselves and their posterity, not to other peoples
of the world who neither ceded authority to it in exchange for
certain guarantees of liberty nor otherwise consented to its rule. 92
According to the dissent, since the defendant, a Mexican national,
had not taken upon himself the obligations of U.S. citizenship or
residency, the defendant had no right to claim the protections con-
tained in the Fourth Amendment.
The majority rejected this interpretation of the Constitution. It
found the historical record much less clear than the dissent with
respect to the relation of government to the people. In particular,
the majority noted that the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of
Independence, among other documents, were based upon a theory
of "natural rights," rights which no government could encroach
upon.93 The majority also found in Supreme Court precedent support
for the idea that the Constitution may be invoked by foreign nationals
who are subject to the control of the United States government. 94
The discussion by the majority and dissent is of course of great
academic interest. Strong arguments can be made both in favor of
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1218-24.
89. Id. at 1224-28.
90. Id. at 1228-30.
91. Id. at 1233 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1219-20.
94. Id. at 1221-24.
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a compact theory of government and in favor of a natural rights
theory. It seems likely that the Supreme Court will not choose to
rest its decision upon any one view of the purpose of government
or the fundamental nature of the Constitution, especially when that
issue can be relatively easily avoided.
The Supreme Court is also likely to give the second issue, whether
the search was a "joint venture" of American and Mexican law
enforcement officials, scant attention. Both searches were requested
by United States Drug Enforcement Agency officers; DEA officers
were present during the first search and actually conducted the second
search. A more active involvement of United States law enforcement
officials could hardly be imagined. Although the Supreme Court has
not itself formally enforced the "joint venture" doctrine, it has
received widespread acceptance in the courts of appeals, although
there is some disagreement as to the exact formulation of the doc-
trine.95 The Supreme Court is likely to recognize the "joint venture"
doctrine and hold that the United States government can be charged
with responsiblity for the search of the two homes.
The issue most likely to be dispositive is whether the DEA agents
were entitled to rely in good faith upon the statements by Mexican
officials that the search was legal under Mexican law. The Ninth
Circuit held that no good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment
applied because the circumstances did not prevent the DEA agents
from securing a search warrant from a United States magistrate.9 6
The court's holding is strange because, as the court itself recog-
nizes, "a warrant issued by an American magistrate would be a dead
letter in Mexico" and "it would be an affront to a foreign country's
sovereignty if the DEA presented an American warrant and suggested
that it gave the American agents all the authority they needed to
search a foreign residence." 97 Although not mentioned by the Ninth
Circuit, requesting a United States court to issue a warrant that is
nowhere enforceable might also be an "affront" to the United States
court, which might refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in circumstances
when the judgment requested would have no legal effect.98
The Supreme Court is almost certain to reverse the Ninth Circuit's
decision. In recent years, the Supreme Court has looked more fa-
95. The cases are cited and discussed in Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1225.
96. Id. at 1230.
97. Id. at 1229-30.
98. Ordinarily, federal courts refuse to issue advisory opinions or judgments which have
no legal force. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1796).
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vorably upon the creation of "good faith" exceptions to the exclu-
sionary rule.99 Inexplicably, the Ninth Circuit failed to cite any of
these decisions in its opinion. The court's discussion of good faith
exceptions was limited to a discussion of United States v. Peterson, 00
a Ninth Circuit opinion which, contrary to the decision in Verdugo-
Urquidez, held that United States law enforcement officials were
entitled to rely in good faith upon the assurances of high ranking
foreign law enforcement authorities that a search conducted within
that foreign jurisdiction was proper under foreign law,
In United States v. Peterson, DEA agents relied upon the repre-
sentations of high ranking law enforcement authorities in the Philip-
pines that a planned phone tap was legal under Phillipine law.' 0' The
information gained through the phone tap was used to locate a ship
loaded with marijuana. 102 In an opinion written by then Judge, and
now Justice Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit held that, because of the
DEA agents' good faith reliance upon the representations of legality
made by Phillipine officials, evidence obtained as a result of the
phone tap should not have been suppressed in the subsequent criminal
trial.
The Ninth Circuit in Verdugo-Urquidez purported to distinguish
Peterson on the ground that "[t]he warrantless search of the vessel
in Peterson was permissible due to exigent circumstances inherent in
a high seas search."' 1 3 Since the search of two Mexican homes did
not involve similar exigent circumstances, the court felt free to ignore
the holding in Peterson.
The decision in Peterson was not based upon exigent circumstances,
however. Judge Kennedy explained in Peterson the rationale of
permitting a good faith exception in the context of searches in foreign
jurisdictions:
American law enforcement officers were not in an advantageous
position to judge whether the search was lawful, as would have
been the case in a domestic setting. Holding them to a strict liability
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standard for failings of their foreign associates would be even more
incongruous than holding law enforcement officials to a strict
liability standard as to the adequacy of domestic warrants.2 4
We should expect the Supreme Court to adopt this rationale and
to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision in Verdugo-Urquidez.
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